5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Codex
b06e59adb4 sdk(P1.10): embedded parity self-test + attesto doctor
A trimmed (~1.7 KB) copy of the cross-language parity vectors now ships inside
each package (Python package-data JSON, Go go:embed, TS generated module). On
the first hashing operation per process each SDK recomputes the commitment
hash, the receipt domain-hash, and an inclusion fold against the vendored
vectors and fails closed (AttestoSelfTestError / ErrSelfTest) on any mismatch
— a corrupted install or diverging runtime can never silently produce wrong
evidence. Result is cached (including failure); cost <5 ms once. Corrupting a
vendored vector is test-asserted to fail closed in all three languages. The
frozen canonical primitives are untouched; the gate lives in the commitment/
verify entry points built on top of them.

attesto doctor: Go CLI subcommand and Python attesto.doctor(), producing a
deterministic {"ok", "checks"} report — vendored self-test, head-store
writability, number-policy dry-run on a sample payload, Ed25519 availability
(Python), and with credentials: reachability, protocol-header acceptance, and
clock skew vs the server Date header (warn >30 s; webhooks break at 300 s).

package_artifact_policy allows exactly attesto/_selftest_vectors.json in the
wheel (verified: built wheel contains it, policy green). READMEs updated.
This completes the last Phase-1 build item.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-11 19:43:24 +02:00
Codex
7d3e8c5b4f sdk(P1.4): inbound webhook verification helper in all three SDKs
Customers receiving Attesto webhook deliveries can now verify them with one
call, mirroring backend/app/services/webhooks/signing.py exactly: read the
X-Attesto-Timestamp / X-Attesto-Signature headers (case-insensitive), reject
when abs(now - ts) > max_skew_s (300 s default, replay protection), recompute
hex(hmac_sha256(secret, f"{timestamp}.{body}")), constant-time compare
(hmac.compare_digest / charcode-XOR fold over equal-length hex / hmac.Equal).

- Python: attesto.verify_webhook(body=, headers=, secret=, max_skew_s=, now=)
- TypeScript: verifyWebhook({ body, headers, secret, maxSkewS, now }) via
  WebCrypto HMAC (edge-safe)
- Go: VerifyWebhook(body, headers, secret, maxSkewS)

New corpus golden-vectors/sdk-parity/webhook.json (valid, within-skew,
skewed-timestamp, bad-signature, tampered-body, wrong-secret,
non-numeric-timestamp) with backend-derived signatures; all three SDKs agree
on every case. READMEs gain a "Receiving Attesto webhooks" example.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-11 18:12:32 +02:00
Codex
a6a14e5fbb sdk(P1.3): inclusion, checkpoint-chain, and completeness verification
Completes the offline verification stack (P1.2 -> P1.1 -> P1.3) in all three
SDKs, each a faithful port of the backend windows.py / checkpoints.py math on
top of the frozen canonical/domain-hash primitives:

- verify_inclusion_proof: fold a window inclusion proof to the window root
  (domain attesto.v2.window; left sibling -> node(sibling,current), right ->
  node(current,sibling)).
- verify_checkpoint_root: recompute a checkpoint root from window hashes
  (domain attesto.v2.checkpoint), with an odd node at any level **promoted
  unchanged** rather than duplicated/hashed with itself (the place a naive
  Merkle port silently diverges).
- verify_checkpoint_extension: current.from_seq_no == previous.to_seq_no + 1
  and current.previous_checkpoint_hash == previous.checkpoint_hash.
- verify_completeness: proves no events were omitted in a range -- gap-free
  seq_no coverage plus prev_event_hash chaining to the previous event_hash.

New corpus golden-vectors/sdk-parity/inclusion.json (5-leaf window exercising
the promoted odd node, 3-window checkpoint root, extension + completeness
negatives), exported from the backend functions. Proven: Python = TypeScript =
Go = backend agree on every case. READMEs updated per SDK.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-11 14:29:48 +02:00
Codex
27a1bfcd00 sdk(P1.2): payload commitment + safe-number preflight in all three SDKs
Adds payload_commitment / metadata_commitment / verify_payload_commitment
and assert_commitment_safe_numbers to the Python, TypeScript, and Go SDKs,
each building on the frozen canonical_json/domain_hash primitives (no change
to their byte output). The number preflight is a byte-for-byte port of the
backend assert_commitment_safe_numbers (floats rejected, |int| > 2^53-1
rejected, bool exempt) and is wired into the v2 log_event / log_events send
path, raising a typed AttestoUnsafeNumberError with the JSON path so the rule
fails at dev time rather than as a production 422; preflight=False /
SkipPreflight defers to the server.

New shared corpus golden-vectors/sdk-parity/canonical-numbers.json (15 accept
+ 8 reject), accept-hashes generated from the backend _commitment. Proven:
Python = TypeScript = Go = backend produce byte-identical commitment hashes
for every accept vector and identical reject paths (the Go float64-vs-Python-
int serialization parity holds). READMEs updated per SDK.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-11 14:05:49 +02:00
Codex
61f3a217e6 Add SDK parity and Go CLI release readiness 2026-06-07 22:41:32 +02:00