sdk(P1.2): payload commitment + safe-number preflight in all three SDKs

Adds payload_commitment / metadata_commitment / verify_payload_commitment
and assert_commitment_safe_numbers to the Python, TypeScript, and Go SDKs,
each building on the frozen canonical_json/domain_hash primitives (no change
to their byte output). The number preflight is a byte-for-byte port of the
backend assert_commitment_safe_numbers (floats rejected, |int| > 2^53-1
rejected, bool exempt) and is wired into the v2 log_event / log_events send
path, raising a typed AttestoUnsafeNumberError with the JSON path so the rule
fails at dev time rather than as a production 422; preflight=False /
SkipPreflight defers to the server.

New shared corpus golden-vectors/sdk-parity/canonical-numbers.json (15 accept
+ 8 reject), accept-hashes generated from the backend _commitment. Proven:
Python = TypeScript = Go = backend produce byte-identical commitment hashes
for every accept vector and identical reject paths (the Go float64-vs-Python-
int serialization parity holds). READMEs updated per SDK.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Codex
2026-06-11 14:05:49 +02:00
parent edec105858
commit 27a1bfcd00
5 changed files with 364 additions and 0 deletions

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@@ -72,6 +72,20 @@ and integers beyond ±(2^531) are rejected at ingestion (HTTP 422); encode
decimals and large integers as strings (e.g. `{"score": "0.87"}`). This keeps
cross-language commitment recomputation byte-exact (`CanonicalJSON`).
The SDK enforces the same rule **locally** before sending, so you see it at dev
time rather than as a production 422. `LogEvent` / `LogEvents` return an
`*UnsafeNumberError` (with `.Path`, the JSON path to the offending value). Set
`RequestOptions{SkipPreflight: true}` to defer to the server.
```go
// Commitment a Proofstream stores for a payload, byte-identical to the server
// (and to the Python / TypeScript SDKs):
commitment, _ := attesto.PayloadCommitment(map[string]any{"decision": "approve", "score_bp": 8700})
// commitment["canonical_payload_hash"] == server's stored hash
ok, _ := attesto.VerifyPayloadCommitment(myPayload, event) // recompute and compare
```
## Verification
Remote verification uses Attesto's public `/v2/verify` API. Offline receipt

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@@ -161,6 +161,16 @@ func (c *Client) LogEvent(ctx context.Context, streamID string, input EventInput
if err := normalizeEventInput(&input); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Reject commitment-unsafe numbers locally so the developer sees the rule at
// dev time rather than as a production 422; SkipPreflight defers to the server.
if !skipPreflight(options) {
if err := AssertCommitmentSafeNumbers(input.Payload, "$.payload"); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := AssertCommitmentSafeNumbers(input.Metadata, "$.metadata"); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
var out EventReceipt
err := c.requestJSON(ctx, http.MethodPost, "/v2/streams/"+url.PathEscape(streamID)+"/events", nil, input, idempotency(options), &out)
return &out, err
@@ -170,10 +180,19 @@ func (c *Client) LogEvents(ctx context.Context, streamID string, events []EventI
if len(events) > 1000 {
return nil, errors.New("max 1000 events per batch")
}
preflight := !skipPreflight(options)
for i := range events {
if err := normalizeEventInput(&events[i]); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("event %d: %w", i, err)
}
if preflight {
if err := AssertCommitmentSafeNumbers(events[i].Payload, fmt.Sprintf("$.events[%d].payload", i)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := AssertCommitmentSafeNumbers(events[i].Metadata, fmt.Sprintf("$.events[%d].metadata", i)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
}
body := M{"events": events}
var out EventBatchResponse
@@ -558,6 +577,10 @@ func retryable(status int) bool {
}
}
func skipPreflight(options []RequestOptions) bool {
return len(options) > 0 && options[0].SkipPreflight
}
func idempotency(options []RequestOptions) string {
if len(options) > 0 && options[0].IdempotencyKey != "" {
return options[0].IdempotencyKey

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@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"math"
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
@@ -69,6 +70,233 @@ func SHA256Hex(value []byte) string {
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
// maxSafeInteger mirrors JavaScript's Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER (2^53 - 1).
// Integers beyond this lose precision when a JS verifier parses them, so they
// would re-serialize to different canonical bytes across languages.
const maxSafeInteger = int64(1)<<53 - 1
// UnsafeNumberError reports a committed payload/metadata number whose
// canonical-JSON bytes diverge across Python, Go, and JavaScript (a non-integer,
// or an integer outside +/-(2^53 - 1)). Path is the JSON path to the offender.
type UnsafeNumberError struct {
Path string
Message string
}
func (e *UnsafeNumberError) Error() string { return e.Message }
func nonIntegerError(path string) *UnsafeNumberError {
return &UnsafeNumberError{
Path: path,
Message: fmt.Sprintf(
"non-integer numbers are not permitted in committed payloads (%s); "+
"encode decimals as strings", path),
}
}
func unsafeIntegerError(path string) *UnsafeNumberError {
return &UnsafeNumberError{
Path: path,
Message: fmt.Sprintf(
"integers beyond +/-2^53-1 are not permitted in committed payloads (%s); "+
"encode large integers as strings", path),
}
}
func assertSafeFloat(v float64, path string) error {
if math.IsInf(v, 0) || math.IsNaN(v) || math.Trunc(v) != v {
return nonIntegerError(path)
}
if math.Abs(v) > float64(maxSafeInteger) {
return unsafeIntegerError(path)
}
return nil
}
func assertSafeInt64(v int64, path string) error {
if v > maxSafeInteger || v < -maxSafeInteger {
return unsafeIntegerError(path)
}
return nil
}
func assertSafeNumberString(s, path string) error {
if strings.ContainsAny(s, ".eE") {
f, err := strconv.ParseFloat(s, 64)
if err != nil {
return nonIntegerError(path)
}
return assertSafeFloat(f, path)
}
n, err := strconv.ParseInt(s, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
// Outside int64 range is necessarily outside the safe integer range.
return unsafeIntegerError(path)
}
return assertSafeInt64(n, path)
}
// AssertCommitmentSafeNumbers rejects numbers whose canonical-JSON bytes diverge
// across Python, Go, and JavaScript, so a commitment computed here matches the
// backend's byte-for-byte. Mirrors assert_commitment_safe_numbers in the backend:
// non-integer numbers are rejected outright; integers must be within +/-(2^53 - 1).
// Booleans are exempt. Returns an *UnsafeNumberError on the first offending value.
func AssertCommitmentSafeNumbers(value any, path string) error {
switch v := value.(type) {
case nil, bool, string:
return nil
case json.Number:
return assertSafeNumberString(v.String(), path)
case float64:
return assertSafeFloat(v, path)
case float32:
return assertSafeFloat(float64(v), path)
case int:
return assertSafeInt64(int64(v), path)
case int8:
return assertSafeInt64(int64(v), path)
case int16:
return assertSafeInt64(int64(v), path)
case int32:
return assertSafeInt64(int64(v), path)
case int64:
return assertSafeInt64(v, path)
case uint:
return assertSafeUint64(uint64(v), path)
case uint8:
return assertSafeInt64(int64(v), path)
case uint16:
return assertSafeInt64(int64(v), path)
case uint32:
return assertSafeInt64(int64(v), path)
case uint64:
return assertSafeUint64(v, path)
case []any:
for i, item := range v {
if err := AssertCommitmentSafeNumbers(item, fmt.Sprintf("%s[%d]", path, i)); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
case []M:
for i, item := range v {
if err := AssertCommitmentSafeNumbers(item, fmt.Sprintf("%s[%d]", path, i)); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
case map[string]any:
return assertSafeMap(v, path)
case M:
return assertSafeMap(map[string]any(v), path)
default:
// Structs and other types: normalize through JSON exactly as the
// canonical encoder does, then re-check the plain representation.
raw, err := json.Marshal(v)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var decoded any
dec := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
dec.UseNumber()
if err := dec.Decode(&decoded); err != nil {
return err
}
return AssertCommitmentSafeNumbers(decoded, path)
}
}
func assertSafeUint64(v uint64, path string) error {
if v > uint64(maxSafeInteger) {
return unsafeIntegerError(path)
}
return nil
}
func assertSafeMap(m map[string]any, path string) error {
for key, item := range m {
if err := AssertCommitmentSafeNumbers(item, fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", path, key)); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// PayloadCommitment returns a deterministic commitment to an event payload,
// byte-identical to the server's stored payload_commitment. Call
// AssertCommitmentSafeNumbers first if the payload is not yet known to be safe.
func PayloadCommitment(payload any) (map[string]string, error) {
raw, err := CanonicalJSON(payload)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return map[string]string{
"hash_alg": "sha256",
"canonical_payload_hash": SHA256Hex(raw),
}, nil
}
// MetadataCommitment returns a deterministic commitment to event metadata,
// byte-identical to the server's stored metadata_commitment.
func MetadataCommitment(metadata any) (map[string]string, error) {
raw, err := CanonicalJSON(metadata)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return map[string]string{
"hash_alg": "sha256",
"canonical_metadata_hash": SHA256Hex(raw),
}, nil
}
func storedCommitmentHash(event map[string]any, commitmentKey, hashKey string) string {
containers := []any{event, event["envelope"], event["envelope_json"]}
for _, container := range containers {
obj, ok := container.(map[string]any)
if !ok {
continue
}
commitment, ok := obj[commitmentKey].(map[string]any)
if !ok {
continue
}
if stored, ok := commitment[hashKey].(string); ok {
return stored
}
}
return ""
}
// VerifyPayloadCommitment recomputes the payload commitment locally and compares
// it to the value stored on an event (payload_commitment.canonical_payload_hash,
// whether the event is given flat or under envelope / envelope_json). Returns
// false when the stored commitment is absent or differs.
func VerifyPayloadCommitment(payload any, event map[string]any) (bool, error) {
stored := storedCommitmentHash(event, "payload_commitment", "canonical_payload_hash")
if stored == "" {
return false, nil
}
commitment, err := PayloadCommitment(payload)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
return commitment["canonical_payload_hash"] == stored, nil
}
// VerifyMetadataCommitment recomputes the metadata commitment locally and
// compares it to the value stored on an event.
func VerifyMetadataCommitment(metadata any, event map[string]any) (bool, error) {
stored := storedCommitmentHash(event, "metadata_commitment", "canonical_metadata_hash")
if stored == "" {
return false, nil
}
commitment, err := MetadataCommitment(metadata)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
return commitment["canonical_metadata_hash"] == stored, nil
}
func SignConnectorWebhookPayload(secret string, body []byte, timestamp int64) (string, string) {
if timestamp == 0 {
timestamp = time.Now().Unix()

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@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
package attesto
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
type parityVectors struct {
Accept []struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Payload map[string]any `json:"payload"`
CanonicalPayloadHash string `json:"canonical_payload_hash"`
} `json:"accept"`
Reject []struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Payload map[string]any `json:"payload"`
Path string `json:"path"`
} `json:"reject"`
}
func loadParityVectors(t *testing.T) parityVectors {
t.Helper()
path := filepath.Join("..", "..", "golden-vectors", "sdk-parity", "canonical-numbers.json")
raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read parity vectors: %v", err)
}
var v parityVectors
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &v); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode parity vectors: %v", err)
}
return v
}
func TestParityAcceptCommitmentHashes(t *testing.T) {
for _, c := range loadParityVectors(t).Accept {
commitment, err := PayloadCommitment(c.Payload)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: PayloadCommitment: %v", c.ID, err)
}
if commitment["hash_alg"] != "sha256" {
t.Errorf("%s: hash_alg %q", c.ID, commitment["hash_alg"])
}
if commitment["canonical_payload_hash"] != c.CanonicalPayloadHash {
t.Errorf("%s: hash %s != %s", c.ID, commitment["canonical_payload_hash"], c.CanonicalPayloadHash)
}
}
}
func TestParityAcceptPassPreflight(t *testing.T) {
for _, c := range loadParityVectors(t).Accept {
if err := AssertCommitmentSafeNumbers(c.Payload, "$"); err != nil {
t.Errorf("%s: unexpected preflight error: %v", c.ID, err)
}
}
}
func TestParityRejectPaths(t *testing.T) {
for _, c := range loadParityVectors(t).Reject {
err := AssertCommitmentSafeNumbers(c.Payload, "$")
var ue *UnsafeNumberError
if !errors.As(err, &ue) {
t.Errorf("%s: expected *UnsafeNumberError, got %v", c.ID, err)
continue
}
if ue.Path != c.Path {
t.Errorf("%s: path %s != %s", c.ID, ue.Path, c.Path)
}
}
}
func TestParityVerifyPayloadCommitment(t *testing.T) {
for _, c := range loadParityVectors(t).Accept {
commitment, err := PayloadCommitment(c.Payload)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: PayloadCommitment: %v", c.ID, err)
}
stored := map[string]any{}
for k, v := range commitment {
stored[k] = v
}
event := map[string]any{"envelope": map[string]any{"payload_commitment": stored}}
ok, err := VerifyPayloadCommitment(c.Payload, event)
if err != nil || !ok {
t.Errorf("%s: verify match ok=%v err=%v", c.ID, ok, err)
}
bad, err := VerifyPayloadCommitment(map[string]any{"tampered": float64(1)}, event)
if err != nil || bad {
t.Errorf("%s: tampered verify bad=%v err=%v", c.ID, bad, err)
}
}
}

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@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ type M map[string]any
type RequestOptions struct {
IdempotencyKey string
// SkipPreflight disables the client-side commitment number preflight, which
// rejects non-integer / out-of-range numbers locally before LogEvent /
// LogEvents sends them. Default false: the preflight runs.
SkipPreflight bool
}
type StreamCreateInput struct {