Customers receiving Attesto webhook deliveries can now verify them with one
call, mirroring backend/app/services/webhooks/signing.py exactly: read the
X-Attesto-Timestamp / X-Attesto-Signature headers (case-insensitive), reject
when abs(now - ts) > max_skew_s (300 s default, replay protection), recompute
hex(hmac_sha256(secret, f"{timestamp}.{body}")), constant-time compare
(hmac.compare_digest / charcode-XOR fold over equal-length hex / hmac.Equal).
- Python: attesto.verify_webhook(body=, headers=, secret=, max_skew_s=, now=)
- TypeScript: verifyWebhook({ body, headers, secret, maxSkewS, now }) via
WebCrypto HMAC (edge-safe)
- Go: VerifyWebhook(body, headers, secret, maxSkewS)
New corpus golden-vectors/sdk-parity/webhook.json (valid, within-skew,
skewed-timestamp, bad-signature, tampered-body, wrong-secret,
non-numeric-timestamp) with backend-derived signatures; all three SDKs agree
on every case. READMEs gain a "Receiving Attesto webhooks" example.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
5.4 KiB
Attesto Go SDK
Official Go SDK for Attesto 2.0 Proofstream. The default API base URL is
https://verify.attesto.eu. Use it from server-side, infrastructure, security
tooling, CI, evidence exporters, and operator automation. Do not embed Attesto API keys in browser bundles, mobile apps, or public artifacts.
Install
go get git.rotz.ai/rotzmediagroup/attesto-v1/sdk/go
The first release is VCS-resolved from the Attesto repository. It intentionally uses only the Go standard library.
Quickstart
package main
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log"
"os"
"time"
attesto "git.rotz.ai/rotzmediagroup/attesto-v1/sdk/go"
)
func main() {
ctx := context.Background()
client, err := attesto.NewClient(os.Getenv("ATTESTO_API_KEY"))
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
stream, err := client.CreateStream(ctx, attesto.StreamCreateInput{
UseCase: "ai-governance",
PolicyID: "policy-main",
})
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
receipt, err := client.LogEvent(ctx, stream.StreamID, attesto.EventInput{
SourceRef: "decision-42",
OccurredAt: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
Payload: attesto.M{
"model": "risk-classifier",
"score": 0.92,
},
})
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
fmt.Println(receipt.StreamEventID, receipt.EventHash)
}
Attesto stores source-system time separately from backend ingest time.
OccurredAt must be RFC3339 with a timezone offset. The Go SDK fills it with
time.Now().UTC() when omitted, but production integrations should pass the
real upstream event timestamp whenever the source system provides one.
Committed payload number rule
When events are committed to a Proofstream, payload and metadata numbers must
serialize identically across Python, Go, and JavaScript. Non-integer numbers
and integers beyond ±(2^53−1) are rejected at ingestion (HTTP 422); encode
decimals and large integers as strings (e.g. {"score": "0.87"}). This keeps
cross-language commitment recomputation byte-exact (CanonicalJSON).
The SDK enforces the same rule locally before sending, so you see it at dev
time rather than as a production 422. LogEvent / LogEvents return an
*UnsafeNumberError (with .Path, the JSON path to the offending value). Set
RequestOptions{SkipPreflight: true} to defer to the server.
// Commitment a Proofstream stores for a payload, byte-identical to the server
// (and to the Python / TypeScript SDKs):
commitment, _ := attesto.PayloadCommitment(map[string]any{"decision": "approve", "score_bp": 8700})
// commitment["canonical_payload_hash"] == server's stored hash
ok, _ := attesto.VerifyPayloadCommitment(myPayload, event) // recompute and compare
Verification
Remote verification uses Attesto's public /v2/verify API. Offline receipt
verification uses ATTESTO-PROOFSTREAM-001 canonical JSON, domain-separated
hashes, and Ed25519 signature verification locally.
report := attesto.VerifyReceiptOffline(receipt.Receipt, publicKeyHex)
if !report.OK {
log.Fatalf("receipt failed verification: %v", report.Problems)
}
The offline trust model extends across the whole proof chain — all client-side:
ok, _ := attesto.VerifyInclusionProof(leafHash, proof, windowRoot) // event in a window root
ok, _ = attesto.VerifyCheckpointRoot(windowHashes, checkpointRoot) // windows fold to checkpoint root
ext := attesto.VerifyCheckpointExtension(previous, current) // one checkpoint continues the previous
comp := attesto.VerifyCompleteness(events, 5, 8) // no events omitted in [5, 8]
VerifyCompleteness proves no events were omitted in a range: the sequence
numbers must be gap-free and each event's prev_event_hash must chain to the
previous event's event_hash.
Your SDK is a witness
The client remembers the last accepted (seqNo, eventHash) per stream and checks
every new receipt links forward. If the server ever rewinds a sequence number or
presents a divergent lineage, LogEvent / LogEvents return a
*ForkDetectedError and the stored head is not advanced. The default store is
in-memory; use a file store for fork detection across process invocations, or
disable it.
// Persist across CLI invocations (atomic, 0600 at ~/.attesto/heads.json):
client, _ := attesto.NewClient(apiKey, attesto.WithHeadStore(attesto.NewFileHeadStore("")))
// Disable fork detection:
client, _ = attesto.NewClient(apiKey, attesto.WithHeadStore(nil))
Receiving Attesto webhooks
func handler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
headers := map[string]string{
"X-Attesto-Timestamp": r.Header.Get("X-Attesto-Timestamp"),
"X-Attesto-Signature": r.Header.Get("X-Attesto-Signature"),
}
if !attesto.VerifyWebhook(body, headers, webhookSecret, 300) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
process(body)
}
Verification recomputes hmac_sha256(secret, "<timestamp>." + body) from the
X-Attesto-Timestamp / X-Attesto-Signature headers, rejects timestamps more
than the allowed skew from now (replay protection), and compares with
hmac.Equal (constant time).
Operator and Admin Endpoints
System-key clients are created with attesto.NewClient. Tenant/operator
endpoints, including connector installation and Local Vault installation
management, use attesto.NewBearerClient with a tenant bearer token obtained
from the dashboard session flow.
Secrets returned once by connector creation are present only in the returned struct and are never logged by the SDK.