The dependency scan reported 14 high/critical findings across the backend and the marketplace frontend. All of them are now closed, and the scan is green for the first time. **Bumped, with the suite as the check.** aiohttp 3.14.1 -> 3.14.3, pyasn1 0.6.3 -> 0.6.4, pydantic-settings 2.14.1 -> 2.15.0, and cryptography 48.0.1 -> 50.0.0. That last one crosses two majors, which is why it was flagged as blast radius rather than a routine bump; the full backend suite passes unchanged. nanoid and postcss in the marketplace frontend are patched and the frontend still builds. **ecdsa has no fix and never will.** CVE-2024-23342 is a Minerva timing attack on P-256, and the project considers side channels out of scope. It arrives through python-jose, and only signing, key generation and ECDH are affected — verification is not. The backend signs tenant tokens with the symmetric JWT_SECRET, so only HMAC families are coherent there anyway. That was true by habit, not by construction: `jwt_algorithm` had no validation at all, so JWT_ALGORITHM=ES256 would have signed through the vulnerable path with nothing to say so. app/core/security.py now refuses any algorithm outside HS256/HS384/HS512, on both the encode and decode paths, and tests/test_jwt_algorithm_guard.py fails if that control is removed. `none` is refused alongside ES*: an unsigned token is not a lesser problem than a badly signed one. The advisory is accepted by exact ID with that control named, using a mechanism added here rather than by silencing the tool. A new advisory on ecdsa still fails, and a package whose every finding is accepted stops being listed as vulnerable so the field keeps meaning something. Backend 1419 passed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
142 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
142 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
package zk
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"encoding/json"
|
|
"os"
|
|
"path/filepath"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
"testing"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// Go parity on the Pedersen opening vectors.
|
|
//
|
|
// These were a declared boundary: verifying them needs ristretto255 scalar
|
|
// arithmetic the dependency-free SDK does not carry. This module carries it, so
|
|
// a consumer who needs exact-opening verification can have it without imposing a
|
|
// curve library on everyone else.
|
|
|
|
func loadVector(t *testing.T, name string) map[string]any {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
path := filepath.Join("..", "..", "..", "golden-vectors", "provenance-v0.1-dev", name+".json")
|
|
raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("read %s: %v", name, err)
|
|
}
|
|
var vector map[string]any
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &vector); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("parse %s: %v", name, err)
|
|
}
|
|
return vector
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func openingFrom(t *testing.T, vector map[string]any) (map[string]any, uint64, string) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
descriptor := vector["descriptor"].(map[string]any)
|
|
value := uint64(vector["encoded_value"].(float64))
|
|
return descriptor, value, vector["blinding_scalar"].(string)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestGeneratorPairMatchesTheFrozenRegistry(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Constants that drifted would commit under a different pair than the
|
|
// protocol declares, and every commitment would be unopenable elsewhere.
|
|
raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("..", "..", "..", "docs", "protocol", "zk-generator-registry.md"))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("read registry: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
registry := string(raw)
|
|
for _, pinned := range []string{GeneratorSetID, GeneratorBHex, GeneratorHHex} {
|
|
if !strings.Contains(registry, pinned) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("registry no longer carries %s", pinned)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestAValidOpeningReproducesTheRustCommitment(t *testing.T) {
|
|
vector := loadVector(t, "provenance-private-numeric-opening-valid")
|
|
descriptor, value, blinding := openingFrom(t, vector)
|
|
ok, err := VerifyOpening(descriptor, value, blinding)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("verify: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if ok != vector["expected_valid"].(bool) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("got %v want %v", ok, vector["expected_valid"])
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestAWrongOpeningDoesNotReproduceTheCommitment(t *testing.T) {
|
|
for _, name := range []string{
|
|
"provenance-private-numeric-opening-wrong-value",
|
|
"provenance-private-numeric-opening-wrong-blinding",
|
|
} {
|
|
vector := loadVector(t, name)
|
|
descriptor, value, blinding := openingFrom(t, vector)
|
|
ok, err := VerifyOpening(descriptor, value, blinding)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("%s: verify: %v", name, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if ok != vector["expected_valid"].(bool) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("%s: got %v want %v", name, ok, vector["expected_valid"])
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestTheCommittedCommitmentIsWhatAValidOpeningProduces(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Reads the commitment back out, so a check that always returned true fails.
|
|
vector := loadVector(t, "provenance-private-numeric-commitment-valid")
|
|
descriptor := vector["descriptor"].(map[string]any)
|
|
value := uint64(vector["expected_encoded_value"].(float64))
|
|
blinding := vector["blinding_scalar"].(string)
|
|
|
|
ok, err := VerifyOpening(descriptor, value, blinding)
|
|
if err != nil || !ok {
|
|
t.Fatalf("a valid opening did not verify: ok=%v err=%v", ok, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pedersen := descriptor["pedersen"].(map[string]any)
|
|
pedersen["commitment"] = strings.Repeat("00", 32)
|
|
ok, err = VerifyOpening(descriptor, value, blinding)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("verify: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if ok {
|
|
t.Fatal("a tampered commitment still verified")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestTheSameMeasurementUnderTwoBlindingsIsUnlinkable(t *testing.T) {
|
|
vector := loadVector(t, "provenance-private-numeric-commitment-randomized")
|
|
if vector["first_commitment"] == vector["second_commitment"] {
|
|
t.Fatal("two blindings produced the same commitment")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestADescriptorNamingAnotherGeneratorSetIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// "rejected" is not "invalid": the input is refused before any check runs.
|
|
vector := loadVector(t, "provenance-private-numeric-wrong-generator-set")
|
|
descriptor, value, blinding := openingFrom(t, vector)
|
|
if _, err := VerifyOpening(descriptor, value, blinding); err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("a foreign generator set was accepted")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestAWidenedEncodingDomainIsNotTheCurveChecksBusiness(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// A claim about semantics is refused by whoever validates the profile. The
|
|
// commitment still opens, and saying otherwise would blame the wrong layer.
|
|
vector := loadVector(t, "provenance-private-numeric-encoding-mismatch")
|
|
descriptor, value, blinding := openingFrom(t, vector)
|
|
ok, err := VerifyOpening(descriptor, value, blinding)
|
|
if err != nil || !ok {
|
|
t.Fatalf("the commitment should still open: ok=%v err=%v", ok, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestAMalformedOpeningIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
|
|
vector := loadVector(t, "provenance-private-numeric-opening-valid")
|
|
descriptor, value, _ := openingFrom(t, vector)
|
|
for _, blinding := range []string{"nothex", strings.Repeat("ab", 31), "", strings.Repeat("ff", 32)} {
|
|
if _, err := VerifyOpening(descriptor, value, blinding); err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("a malformed blinding %q was accepted", blinding)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|