# Attesto Go SDK

Official Go SDK for Attesto 2.0 Proofstream. The default API base URL is
`https://verify.attesto.eu`. Use it from server-side, infrastructure, security
tooling, CI, evidence exporters, and operator automation. Do not embed Attesto API keys in browser bundles, mobile apps, or public artifacts.

## Install

```shell
go get git.rotz.ai/rotzmediagroup/attesto-v1/sdk/go
```

The first release is VCS-resolved from the Attesto repository. It intentionally
uses only the Go standard library.

## Quickstart

```go
package main

import (
	"context"
	"fmt"
	"log"
	"os"
	"time"

	attesto "git.rotz.ai/rotzmediagroup/attesto-v1/sdk/go"
)

func main() {
	ctx := context.Background()
	client, err := attesto.NewClient(os.Getenv("ATTESTO_API_KEY"))
	if err != nil {
		log.Fatal(err)
	}

	stream, err := client.CreateStream(ctx, attesto.StreamCreateInput{
		UseCase:  "ai-governance",
		PolicyID: "policy-main",
	})
	if err != nil {
		log.Fatal(err)
	}

	receipt, err := client.LogEvent(ctx, stream.StreamID, attesto.EventInput{
		SourceRef:  "decision-42",
		OccurredAt: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
		Payload: attesto.M{
			"model": "risk-classifier",
			"score": 0.92,
		},
	})
	if err != nil {
		log.Fatal(err)
	}

fmt.Println(receipt.StreamEventID, receipt.EventHash)
}
```

Attesto stores source-system time separately from backend ingest time.
`OccurredAt` must be RFC3339 with a timezone offset. The Go SDK fills it with
`time.Now().UTC()` when omitted, but production integrations should pass the
real upstream event timestamp whenever the source system provides one.

## Committed payload number rule

When events are committed to a Proofstream, payload and metadata numbers must
serialize identically across Python, Go, and JavaScript. Non-integer numbers
and integers beyond ±(2^53−1) are rejected at ingestion (HTTP 422); encode
decimals and large integers as strings (e.g. `{"score": "0.87"}`). This keeps
cross-language commitment recomputation byte-exact (`CanonicalJSON`).

The SDK enforces the same rule **locally** before sending, so you see it at dev
time rather than as a production 422. `LogEvent` / `LogEvents` return an
`*UnsafeNumberError` (with `.Path`, the JSON path to the offending value). Set
`RequestOptions{SkipPreflight: true}` to defer to the server.

```go
// Commitment a Proofstream stores for a payload, byte-identical to the server
// (and to the Python / TypeScript SDKs):
commitment, _ := attesto.PayloadCommitment(map[string]any{"decision": "approve", "score_bp": 8700})
// commitment["canonical_payload_hash"] == server's stored hash

ok, _ := attesto.VerifyPayloadCommitment(myPayload, event) // recompute and compare
```

## Verification

Remote verification uses Attesto's public `/v2/verify` API. Offline receipt
verification uses `ATTESTO-PROOFSTREAM-001` canonical JSON, domain-separated
hashes, and Ed25519 signature verification locally.

```go
report := attesto.VerifyReceiptOffline(receipt.Receipt, publicKeyHex)
if !report.OK {
	log.Fatalf("receipt failed verification: %v", report.Problems)
}
```

The offline trust model extends across the whole proof chain — all client-side:

```go
ok, _ := attesto.VerifyInclusionProof(leafHash, proof, windowRoot)   // event in a window root
ok, _ = attesto.VerifyCheckpointRoot(windowHashes, checkpointRoot)   // windows fold to checkpoint root
ext := attesto.VerifyCheckpointExtension(previous, current)          // one checkpoint continues the previous
comp := attesto.VerifyCompleteness(events, 5, 8)                     // no events omitted in [5, 8]
```

`VerifyCompleteness` proves **no events were omitted** in a range: the sequence
numbers must be gap-free and each event's `prev_event_hash` must chain to the
previous event's `event_hash`.

## Your SDK is a witness

The client remembers the last accepted `(seqNo, eventHash)` per stream and checks
every new receipt links forward. If the server ever rewinds a sequence number or
presents a divergent lineage, `LogEvent` / `LogEvents` return a
`*ForkDetectedError` and the stored head is not advanced. The default store is
in-memory; use a file store for fork detection across process invocations, or
disable it.

```go
// Persist across CLI invocations (atomic, 0600 at ~/.attesto/heads.json):
client, _ := attesto.NewClient(apiKey, attesto.WithHeadStore(attesto.NewFileHeadStore("")))

// Disable fork detection:
client, _ = attesto.NewClient(apiKey, attesto.WithHeadStore(nil))
```

## Verify anchors on-chain

`VerifyAnchorOnchain` checks an anchor epoch against the chain itself — one raw
JSON-RPC `eth_call` to the anchoring contract's `getCommitment(batchId)`
(comparing the on-chain merkle root) plus a transaction-receipt check (status,
block). No web3 dependency; the RPC endpoint is yours, so this never asks
Attesto to confirm Attesto.

```go
anchor, _ := client.GetAnchorEpoch(ctx, "aep_...")
report := attesto.VerifyAnchorOnchain(ctx, anchor, "https://polygon-rpc.example", 15*time.Second)
if !report.OK {
	log.Fatalf("anchor failed on-chain verification: %v", report.Problems)
}
```

CLI equivalent (fetch + on-chain check in one step):

```bash
attesto anchors verify aep_... --rpc-url https://polygon-rpc.example
```

## Receiving Attesto webhooks

```go
func handler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
	headers := map[string]string{
		"X-Attesto-Timestamp": r.Header.Get("X-Attesto-Timestamp"),
		"X-Attesto-Signature": r.Header.Get("X-Attesto-Signature"),
	}
	if !attesto.VerifyWebhook(body, headers, webhookSecret, 300) {
		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}
	process(body)
}
```

Verification recomputes `hmac_sha256(secret, "<timestamp>." + body)` from the
`X-Attesto-Timestamp` / `X-Attesto-Signature` headers, rejects timestamps more
than the allowed skew from now (replay protection), and compares with
`hmac.Equal` (constant time).

## Operator and Admin Endpoints

System-key clients are created with `attesto.NewClient`. Tenant/operator
endpoints, including connector installation and Local Vault installation
management, use `attesto.NewBearerClient` with a tenant bearer token obtained
from the dashboard session flow.

Secrets returned once by connector creation are present only in the returned
struct and are never logged by the SDK.